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Ecological Empowerment and Enterprise Zones: 
Pain Free Transitions to Sustainable Production in Cities or Fool’s Gold? 
 
Philip Monaghan, Peter North, and Alan Southern 
 
University of Liverpool, Department of Geography and Planning / 
Management School, Liverpool L69 8TZ, monagp@liverpool.ac.uk 
 
Abstract 
 
An Enterprise Zone (EZ) based on cleaner production is an increasingly 
popular government policy to accelerate the sustainable cities agenda. The 
purpose of this review paper is to critique EZ theory and the credibility of 
policy transfer to sustainable production in cities. To this end we undertook a 
literature review on EZ theory; produced a survey of cleaner production EZs 
to highlight its application in England; and developed a conceptual framework 
for a triple bottom line form of EZ. Based on our findings we argue that for the 
credible transfer of EZ theory to the sustainable cities agenda, policy should 
align to our conceptual framework for an Ecological Empowerment and 
Enterprise Zone (EEEZ). The EEEZ is an EZ which is ecologically restorative, 
places an emphasis on community involvement to better harness market 
forces, and understands the utility of state with the public sector as an 
entrepreneur. These research results will be of value to the literature focused 
on spatial low carbon enterprise strategy. 
 
Highlights: 
• Our survey results suggest that cleaner production EZs are a common 
phenomenon: in England four fifths of the 24 EZs in operation have an 
explicit interest. Examples include Sunderland’s low carbon vehicle 
corridor and Hull's green port with offshore energy.  
• However, our typology to analyse EZs also indicates they display different 
sustainable characteristics: i) advanced standards for control of material 
throughputs during planning or operation; ii) manufacture and export of low 
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2 
carbon technologies; and iii) steady state transition through ecological 
regeneration and community capacity building. 
 
Key words: Sustainable cities; Industrial strategy; Deregulatory incentives 
 
Abbreviations 
ABI Area Based Initiative 
BREEAM Building Research Establishment Environmental Assessment 
Methodology 
EEEZ Ecological Empowerment and Enterprise Zone 
EIP Eco-Industrial Park 
EZ Enterprise Zone 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GHG Greenhouse Gas 
Ha Hectares 
ILO International Labour Organization 
LEP Local Enterprise Partnership 
SSE Steady State Economy 
UDC Urban Development Corporation 
 
Word count: 9,569 (excluding abstract and bibliography) 
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper argues that government initiatives to adopt a new and cleaner 
production form of Enterprise Zone (EZ) policy to aid the transition to 
sustainable cities unnecessarily run the risk of failure if policymakers do not 
heed lessons from the performance of previous forms of EZ policy and adopt 
a more holistic and triple bottom line approach to sustainable production.  
 
There is no universally accepted definition of an EZ, reflective of the diverse 
nomenclature, purpose and application of this economic instrument. It is one 
form of Area Based Initiative (ABI), the objective of which takes many types: 
community empowerment, foreign direct investment, deregulation, or a spur to 
innovate and experiment. According to Squires and Hall (2013: 81) an EZ is ‘a 
policy of deploying spatially targeted fiscal incentives to promote 
regeneration’. By comparison, Farole and Akinci (2011: 3) describe an EZ as: 
 
”demarcated geographic areas contained within a country’s national 
boundaries where the rules of business are different from those that 
prevail in the national territory. These differential rules principally deal 
with investment conditions, international trade and customs, taxation, 
and the regulatory environment; whereby the zone is given a business 
environment that is intended to be more liberal from a policy 
perspective and more effective from an administrative perspective than 
that of the national territory”. 
 
The EZ is usually one part of an overall economic reform strategy for creating 
jobs, diversifying exports and enhancing the competitiveness of 
manufacturers or service providers in a particular place.  Enthusiasts for EZs 
argue that they are intended to counter local land or market failure by realising 
agglomeration benefits from concentrating industries in one geographical area 
(e.g. efficiencies from more effective  government support for and supervision 
of enterprises, provision of off-site infrastructure, improved environmental 
controls, and increased supply and sub-contracting relationships among 
industries). The EZ or an ABI with similar spatially targeted enterprise 
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4 
characteristics to those outlined above may be called by another name, 
including: Special Enterprise Zone, Free Enterprise Zone, Export Processing 
Zone, Accelerated Development Zone, Empowerment Zone, Special 
Economic Area, Business Improvement District, Innovation 
Cluster/Hub/Centre, or Industrial Park (Farole and Akinci, 2011; Squires and 
Hall, 2013; Monaghan, 2013). In their current, laissez-faire form, in England 
they are strongly rooted in the rejection of the radical local socialism 
strategies of the urban left in the 1980s especially which, deregulatory 
advocates argued, ‘put off’ business (Robson, 1998).  In this context, EZs first 
manifested themselves in the form of the Urban Development Corporations 
(UDC). More widely, as we show below, EZs are a fundamental component of 
entrepreneurial, as opposed to managerial, conceptions of urbanism (Harvey, 
1989). This is an important distinction as it grounds the concept in the wider 
‘state-business-society’ discussion. 
 
While their contemporary manifestation is strongly rooted in deregulatory 
conceptions of urbanism in terms of being spaces where regulations are 
consciously relaxed, the case for policies to encourage enterprises to locate in 
a specific area are strongly grounded in economic theory more widely, both 
orthodox and new. This ranges from the attraction in economic geography to 
the strategic benefits from being a location of choice, attempts to address 
uneven regional development and rebalance the economy, through its 
application as a deregulated, market-based solution to insufficient levels of 
utility or wealth by the removal of what was perceived to be “the dead hand of 
bureaucracy” (Taylor, 1981: 421), to a type of ecological economics which is 
framed by the need to adapt to climate change and value resource scarcity by 
decoupling growth from the use of fossil fuels (Wang et al, 2010). EZ policy 
(broadly conceived) assumes that several conditions hold true (Greenbaum 
and Engberg, 2004), namely that: i) economic barriers such as poor access to 
capital, skilled labour or transport cause an area’s lack of economic activity; ii) 
public officials can identify the right EZ incentives to overcome these 
economic barriers by encouraging businesses to locate in these spaces (and 
this may or may not include deregulation, it might include other incentives); 
and iii) that EZs increase overall growth.   
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The cleaner production EZ is intended to be different from other forms of EZ 
and wider ABI, in particular because it does not necessarily deplete local 
natural assets or rely on deregulatory incentives which diminish social 
standards, and is sympathetic to the utility of the activist state. In order to 
determine the contribution of a new and cleaner production form of EZ policy 
to sustainable cities, it is useful to understand the evolution of EZ theory 
through multiple iterations, informed by different conceptions of political 
economy. After this introduction, the second section sets out the methodology 
for this research. The third section investigates the origins of EZ policy. The 
aim is to understand how it first emerged, and why it is being adapted to be 
applied to sustainable production in cities. The fourth section critiques the 
empirical evidence on different programmes’ success or failure, taking 
England as an example on the basis that there are so many diverse 
programmes across many countries it is not practical to cover them all in this 
paper. The aim is to give a fair and balanced record of the economic and 
ecological merits of the EZs as they exist so far, in order to determine the 
benefits of applying EZ policy to accelerate sustainable production in cities. 
The final section compares and contrasts a number of types of cleaner 
production EZs. The goal is to highlight the variety of approaches to this new 
and cleaner production form of Z and to further develop the concept of a 
progressive variation, the Ecological Empowerment and Enterprise Zone 
(EEEZ), setting out how the EEEZ would be a constructive response to 
existing strengths and weakness of EZ policy making.  
 
 
2. Methodology 
 
This paper distils the relevant latest findings from research which aims to test 
the hypothesis: 
 
EZ policy can aid the transition to local sustainable development by 
contributing to socio-economic regeneration and the restoration of 
natural assets. 
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This research contributes to the body of literature focused on spatial low 
carbon enterprise strategy (Luque-Ayala and Marvin, 2015; Hodson and 
Marvin, 2012; Bulkeley et al, 2010). It is intended to contribute to knowledge 
management by assisting those in the policy community to develop city 
strategy that leads to cleaner production, economic development, and 
community involvement at a theoretical intersection of economic geography 
(Greenbaum and Engberg, 2004), industrial strategy (Lall, 2003), the utility of 
public sector intervention (Mazzucato, 2013), and steady state transition 
(Jackson, 2009). 
 
This paper shares research insights related to i) a review of the literature on 
EZ policy origins and history, ii) a survey of cleaner production EZs in 
England. In distilling these initial insights, this paper sets out iii) a proposal for 
a new conceptual framework to develop a progressive form of EZ, the EEEZ.  
 
The literature review critiques over 90 papers and data sources on EZs, urban 
regeneration, and industrial strategy published from the late 1970s to 2014. 
This period is deemed appropriate on the basis that is generally accepted that 
the modern version of the EZ emerged and grew rapidly from the late 1970s 
onwards (see for example Butler, 1981; Taylor, 1981; Greenbaum, 1998; 
Farole and Akinci, 2011).  
 
The survey of cleaner production EZs is based on this international literature 
review and an online search of 24 EZs in England. The criteria for 
classification of a cleaner production EZ in the survey is that the particular EZ: 
co-located enterprise in a distinct geographical area; utilised a deregulatory 
regime; and displayed specific sustainability features. The research is not 
intended to focus on all forms of spatial low carbon strategy, of which there 
are many versions. This means, for instance, that many of the various Eco-
Industrial Parks (EIPs) or Low Emission Zones are excluded from the list as 
they do not utilise a deregulatory incentive, e.g. the primary purpose of 
London’s Low Emission Zone in England is the application of a congestion 
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7 
charge for motorists to tackle air pollution and traffic delays as opposed to 
boost enterprise. 
 
The proposal for a conceptual framework on an EEEZ is informed by the 
results of this literature review and survey. The EEEZ omits the features of 
failed EZ initiatives and includes the features of or ideas for successful ones 
(see for example Wilder and Ruben, 1996; Greenbaum and Landers, 2009; 
Cato, 2013; Monaghan, 2013). 
 
 
3. Theoretical basis for EZ policy experimentation over three centuries 
 
3.1 Origins and evolution of EZ theory 
 
The strategy of concentrating or focussing economic development in 
particular places through ABIs has been around in different forms for 
centuries (Farole and Akinci, 2011). According to Farole and Akinci (2011), 
based on an ILO dataset (Boyenge, 2007), in 1986 there were reportedly 176 
EZs in 47 countries, but by 2006 there were estimated to be over 3,500 EZs in 
130 countries in the global north and south alike ranging from China and India 
to Mexico and the USA which accounted for more than $200 billion in exports 
and directly employed at least 40 million workers.  
 
The strategic intent of applying EZ policy appears to have varied over time 
owing to a specific challenge or local situation (Greenbaum and Landers, 
2009; Mossberger, 2010; and Monaghan, 2013). This first wave emerged in 
the 1800s to secure shipping trade routes (realising the benefits of locational 
advantage). It resurfaced in a new wave during the 1970s as a deregulatory 
prescription to reverse inner city decline or regional unemployment (through 
which  deregulation results in wealth creation that, advocates argued, would 
trickle down to those in need if business was allowed to flourish and was not 
artificially restricted). It evolved again in a new wave in the 2000s to 
accelerate green growth (one or both as a deregulatory solution to an 
environmental or social need and owing to the attraction of locational 
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advantage). It is important to note here, that one wave does not necessarily 
replace another, or that an EZ may be created or evolved to display 
characteristics of each type. Rather, it possibly represents a milestone in the 
experimentation or development of a unique form of EZ policy application, in 
different circumstances during different periods of time, as part of a wider 
economic reform strategy. The varying strategic intention of applying EZ 
policy also alerts us to the diversity of enterprise-focused ABIs, the unfocused 
use of ‘enterprise’ and ‘empowerment’ as spraycan words used to depoliticise 
ABIs and obscure their subjective policy origins, and to the need for 
conceptual clarity.     
 
 
3.2. Contemporary EZs: Regenerating cities 
 
Butler (1981), Taylor (1981), Greenbaum (1998), and Hirasuna and Michael 
(2005) all credit England with the idea for the modern version of the EZ in the 
late 1970s as a deregulatory tool to promote industrial rejuvenation through 
the establishment of ABIs characterised by deregulation. While it rejected the 
local socialist experiments of radical Labour councils of the 1980s, the then 
Conservative English Government was impressed by the rapid economic 
growth in the freeports of Asia (e.g. Hong Kong, Singapore). Consequently, 
seven EZs were created as a way to reverse the decline of English inner city 
areas by incentivising entrepreneurs to establish or expand businesses, 
create jobs and make environmental improvements by removing these areas 
from the control of the local authority (e.g. Isle of Dogs in London, Speke in 
Liverpool, and Salford Docks/Trafford Park in Manchester). These inner city 
areas suffered from pockets of severe deprivation and potency for civil 
disorder which was considered to be a consequence of the decline of old 
industries as markets and technologies changed, populations migrated and 
city finances failed (i.e. the flight of young skilled workers or the wealthy to the 
suburbs, leaving behind an older unskilled population or poor families, with 
less amenities). According to Taylor (1981), this implied a criticism of too 
much state intervention in the previous years, which was perceived to have 
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failed to break the ‘cycle of deprivation’ such as social policies to fund play 
parks or support racial integration.  
 
Thus, the English Government’s EZ policy programme which came into force 
through the Local Government Planning and Land Act 1980 and delivered 
through new UDCs was framed as an anti-interventionist market solution to 
inner city problems. Firms were to be ‘freed’ from state interference ‘to make 
profits and create jobs’ (Catalano,1983:51) through exemptions from: tax 
liability (capital expenditure on buildings, development land, local authority 
business rates, customs warehousing duties for imported goods); elements of 
planning or pollution controls and employment protection and health and 
safety regulations (whereby developments conforming to the published 
scheme would not require planning permission, and exemption from training 
levies and a requirement to supply information to industrial training boards); 
and government statistics returns (reduction in reporting requirements).  
 
The EZ idea flourished with the support of Chancellor Geoffrey Howe and the 
new Thatcher government through the 1980s. In total 38 EZs, Urban 
Development Corporations (UDCs), were designated between 1981 and 
1986. According to Butler (1981) the EZ concept marked the ‘greenlining’ of 
inner cities as opposed to ‘redlining’, offering the potential to recreate the 
‘frontier’ spirit of innovation which characterises great cities. In effect, a trickle-
up approach to economic development, giving people more control over their 
lives, starting in modest employment before moving gradually up the ladder. 
Butler’s idea is similar to what Porter (1990; 1997) describes as the inner 
city’s comparative advantage. 
 
This experiment of urban laissez-faire was intended to run for 10 years, but 
the limits of pure deregulation quickly became obvious as business began to 
recognise the value of engaging with the local community and the importance 
of government support to secure their profitability by providing investment in 
infrastructure (Mossberger, 2000; Page, 2005). This need was recognised 
more fully in the second wave of UDCs designated in the late 1980s 
(Fordham et al, 1999; Squires and Hall, 2013).  
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A decline in the popularity of EZs occurred during the 1990s and early new 
millennium.  This was attributed to the effects of delays owing to European 
Commission State Aid regulations (House of Commons Library, 2014) and a 
shift in political preference for other forms of area based urban regeneration 
strategies which emphasised the importance of community empowerment, in 
particular under Blair’s New Labour between 1997 and 2009 (Squires and 
Hall, 2013, Shaw and Robinson, 2009; Fordham et al, 1998; North, 2000).  
 
With the election of the Coalition (Conservative/Liberal Democrat) 
Government in 2010, EZ policy once more became a popular economic 
instrument: as of 2015 there were 24 EZs with plans to create more across 
England (HM Government, 2014, 2015). Listed in Table 1 below, more than 
four fifths of these EZs have an explicit interest on exploiting some type of 
cleaner production with a declared sector focus on one or a combination of 
low carbon industry, green enterprise, energy, or construction including the 
built environment. These latest EZs were assigned by the Conservative 
Chancellor George Osborne to specific Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs) 
by appointment or a through competitive bidding process, although a couple 
were announced separately for the Humber and Lancashire in response to job 
losses announced by BAE Systems.1  
 
  
                                                 
1
 LEPs are partnerships between local authorities and business, and were 
established as part of the Coalition Government’s Plan for Growth on the 
basis that the private sector should play a greater role in regeneration. 
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Table 1 Sector focus of current wave of EZs in England 
Enterprise Zone 
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Alconbury Campus (Cambridge)                 
Birmingham                 
Black Country                 
Bristol Temple Quarter                 
Discovery Park (Kent)                 
Great Yarmouth and Lowestoft                 
Harlow                 
Hereford                 
Humber                 
Lancashire                 
Leeds City Region                 
Manchester                 
Mersey Waters (Liverpool)                 
MIRA Technology Park (Leicester)                 
Newquay Aerohub                 
Northampton Waterside                 
Nottingham and Derby                 
North East                 
Royal Docks (London)                 
Sci-Tech Daresbury (Cheshire)                 
Science Value UK (Oxfordshire)                 
Sheffield City Region                 
Solent (Gosport, Hampshire)                 
Tees Valley                 
Percentage of EZs that focus on 
each sector 
 
75 
 
38 
 
13 
 
25 
 
38 
 
4 
 
83 
 
25 
 
13 
 
4 
 
25 
 
17 
 
42 
 
13 
 
4 
 
17 
Source: Author’s tabulation based on desktop search and literature review, 03 
January 2015. 
 
3.3 Accelerating a cleaner production form of rapid urbanisation 
 
Global mega trends such as migration to cities, population growth, and 
addressing climate change and the associated concerns over resource 
scarcity, pollution, and standards of living (see for example Keller and Daly, 
2007; Alcott, 2008; Satterwaite, 2009; Puppim de Oliveira, 2013) has led to 
what Heinberg (2011) argues is a fundamental turning point in human history 
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– ‘peak everything’ - resource depletion, environmental destruction, high 
unemployment and crushing levels of debt. There are two responses to this 
sustainability crisis: technologically innovating a way out, or developing a new 
circular, ecological economy which recognises fundamental resource 
constraints and limits on the planet’s ability to absorb wastes. In part as a way 
to crystallise these responses and the perceived prize of the transition to a 
green economy as the next big wave of capitalism, the past decade has seen 
a steady rise in interest amongst the policy community in experimenting 
again, this time with the so-called ‘ecological’, ‘green’, ‘low-carbon’ or ‘cleaner 
production’ EZs at the city or regional level (Chatham House et al, 2010; 
Wang et al, 2010; Farole and Akinci, 2011; Scott, 2012; Cato, 2013; 
Monaghan, 2013). 
 
A business case cited for these cleaner production EZs is that the proximity of 
firms inside the zone can: 
 
“facilitate the application of the environmental management principles 
of eco-efficiency and industrial ecology through information sharing, 
and provision of coordinated and centralized pollution prevention and 
management services and expertise” (Shah and Rivera, 2007: 269). 
 
More than this, clustering for competitiveness (Porter, 1990; 1997) at the 
regional or sub-national level can best be captured within city centres2, if well 
planned and compact/dense, thus aiding the transition to a green urban 
economy (Meijers, 2007; credit: UN-Habitat, 2012).  
 
The context to the rise of this new wave of EZ experimentation is the influence 
of free market enthusiasts in the policy community ranging from the World 
Bank to Chatham House who promote it as a way to harness cleaner 
production to accelerate growth, instead of having to choose between cleaner 
production and growth. As Bowen and Fankhauser (2011) make the case, this 
green growth ‘narrative’ is attractive for strategic and analytical reasons: 
                                                 
2
 Although not all EZs are in city centres. 
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‘strategic’ because it is about opportunity and reward as opposed to problems 
and punishment; and ‘analytical’ because it is a paradigm shift from the 
marginal abatement cost of climate adaptation to broader economic policy 
that is about human ingenuity, jobs and creative destruction which appeals to 
various perspectives of economic thinking (e.g. Keynesian, Pigovian, and 
Schumpeterian). That is, those who contest the view that climate change is a 
threat to humanity’s future may view sustainability as a constraint to 
development, and consequently either morally repugnant (given continued 
poverty) and impractical, or not the best use of money given limited resources 
(e.g. Lawson, 2008; Lomborg, 2001). Here the counter argument to a focus 
on avoiding dangerous climate change is that, for instance, to increase the 
proportion of poor people with access to drinking water the state should not 
try to limit growth, but make poor people richer through pro-poor, low carbon 
growth. That is, ‘greening’ growth is much more palatable to traditional 
economic thinkers than the notion of ‘limiting’ growth. Thus the sustainability 
or climate change debate should not be framed as consensual or ‘post-
political’ (North 2010), it is deeply political with ‘no cosy consensus’. It is also 
important to recognise the riposte by Cole (1973) of Meadows et al’s (1972) 
‘limits to growth’ ecological thesis; here Cole argues that Meadows et al’s 
‘models of doom’ are fundamentally flawed as, for instance, the system 
dynamics calculations for world scenarios fail to account for technological 
improvement in agricultural productivity driven by human ingenuity.  
 
So, can some form of enterprise-focused ABI, be it of a deregulatory or 
empowering nature, facilitate technological change and drive the green 
economy in ways promoted by more optimistic scenarios by catalysing the 
development of new clean production technologies and processes? 
 
As Table 1 (above) indicates, cleaner production EZs are already here and 
are a common phenomenon: in England four fifths of the 24 EZs in operation 
have an explicit interest in exploiting some type of cleaner production. 
Examples range from Sunderland’s A19 ultra low carbon vehicle corridor 
(North East) through to Hull's green port with offshore energy (Humber). 
 
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
 
14
The criteria for classification as a cleaner production EZ in the review is that 
the EZ: co-locates enterprise in a distinct geographical area; utilises a 
deregulatory regime; and displays specific cleaner production features. On the 
basis of research insights to date, the international literature review and 
English survey show that ‘deregulatory incentives’ include tax relief or grant in 
aid e.g. capital expenditure on buildings or land, local business rates, customs 
duties; removal of worker rights or environmental obligations; and planning 
simplification e.g. application, 24-hour set-up, help desk, reporting regime 
(see for example Catalano, 1983; Peterson, 2009; Squires and Hall, 2013). 
With regards to ‘cleaner production characteristics’, analysis also concludes 
this could include advanced standards for emissions or resource control e.g. 
energy, water, land, biodiversity, atmosphere, minerals; green technology or 
services e.g. electric vehicles, water stress, sustainable food, renewable 
energy, waste reduction, etc.; circular economy or steady state transition e.g. 
industrial symbiosis, ecological restoration, community resilience (Dennis, 
1999; Cato, 2013; Monaghan, 2013). As noted earlier in Section 1.0, the 
research is to focus on all forms of spatial low carbon strategy, of which there 
are many versions. Again, this means, for instance, that many of the various 
EIPs or Low Emission Zones are excluded from the list as they do not utilise a 
deregulatory incentive. 
 
Public officials appear to be applying cleaner production EZ policy at the city 
or regional level in a number of ways as one contribution to the acceleration of 
green development or growth (Chatham House et al, 2010; Faye, 2012; Cato, 
2013; Monaghan, 2013). This policy application is in ways that are very much 
grounded in many varieties of economic theory. These range from attracting 
investment in sector clusters of new low-carbon technologies to diversify 
exports (i.e. re-design of extraction or production methods), through to 
introducing environmental controls to safeguard or mitigate the trade of 
traditional industries by discouraging fossil fuel use and enhancing resiliency 
of supply in energy, water or rare materials (i.e. reducing material input  levels 
or end-pipe emissions). All of these types can and do exist within a single 
country (Section 5.1 develops a typology of cleaner production EZs, with 
supporting examples from England). 
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Such differentiation in the type of cleaner production EZ is important, as it 
reflects the merits of the different responses to the mitigation of dangerous 
anthropogenic climate change, be it to innovate a way out, or to develop a 
new circular economy (Dennis, 1999; Cato, 2013). In terms of the latter, Cato 
(2013) argues that experimentation with EZ policy is only a useful form of eco-
modernisation if it can help to overcome the ‘paradox of green growth’ and 
achieve a Steady State Economy (SSE) of the kind envisaged by Daly (1978, 
1996), Victor (2008) and Jackson (2009). The paradox referred to here is that, 
given the limited carrying capacity of the planet, green growth is an oxymoron 
if it relies on the relative decoupling of economic activity from the use of 
natural resources, as opposed to absolute decoupling (Lorek and 
Spangenberg, 2014; Perrels, 2007). This transition to a SSE is in terms of: 
positive contributions to capabilities for flourishing (e.g. a means to a 
livelihood, participation, security, a sense of belonging); provision of decent 
standards of living (within a constant population size); low material and energy 
throughput (that increase resource productivity); and fresh investment in 
ecological assets (i.e. diverting income to forestation, water infrastructure).  
Cato (2013: 23) makes the case for an Ecological Enterprise Zone as a post-
growth policy which is applied in: 
 
“areas where the resources to succeed are present, but which have not 
thrived in competition for financial investment”.  
 
That is, hot beds for innovation in low carbon technologies and sustainable 
lifestyles, which replenish rather than deplete natural and societal assets. 
However, Dennis and Cato do not set out how this will assist community 
development or cite any examples of ecological EZs that have been, or are, in 
operation: this is a gap in our understanding. 
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4. Empirical evidence of EZ policy success 
 
The hypothesis is, then, that the EZ model can catalyse the transition to local 
sustainable development.  Is this the case?  In answering this, the first 
question to be answered must be ‘have the different EZ programmes 
achieved their multiple objectives?’ If the answer is ‘yes’, the second question 
then is ‘does this type of state intervention represent better value for the 
public purse compared to other policy mechanisms?’.  If again the answer is 
‘yes’, we can proceed to an analysis of the extent that our hypothesis is valid.  
 
4.1 First wave of English EZs during the 1980s 
 
Data to support the argument for EZ policy, whilst compelling in different 
ways, is not entirely positive. In England, a number of studies argue that the 
evidence from the EZs designated during the 1980s paints a limited picture of 
success when it comes to the goal of generating growth.  A government study 
which covered 22 of the 25 EZs designated between 1981 and 1984 found 
that 126,000 jobs were created and more than £2 billion of private capital was 
invested, yielding a public-to-private leverage ratio of about 1 to 2.3 
(Department of Environment, 2005). The study listed four factors that appear 
to have influenced the relative performance of EZs: the comparative 
advantage or special character of an area; the nature of the sites assembled; 
the development strategy of the EZ authority; and the promotion and 
marketing arrangements for the EZ.  
 
A number of subsequent reports by think-tanks such as the Work Foundation 
(Sissons and Brown, 2011) and the Centre for Cities (Larkin and Wilcox, 
2011) have cast doubt on the success of these EZs however. Sissons and 
Brown argue that whilst by 1987 over 4,300 companies were located in 11 
EZs, with an estimated 63,000 jobs created, 80% of these jobs had been 
displaced from other areas and often from within the same city; and of the 
new jobs created only around 25% were attributed to EZ designation. This 
amounted to a cost per job of between £23,000 and £45,000. The Isle of 
Dogs/ Canary Wharf EZ in London is highlighted as a success story however, 
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with the working population jumping from just 7,000 in 1993 to 90,000 by 
2011. In this particular EZ, it is argued, the ease of planning regulations and 
infrastructure investment proved more significant than tax breaks.  
Consequently, Sissons and Brown conclude that EZs will only be part of the 
answer to long-term economic growth if they contribute to and have a 
sustained impact on innovation, trade, skills, infrastructure and 
entrepreneurship. Larkin and Wilcox (2011) draw similar conclusions to 
Sissons and Brown, but also argue that many of the benefits from these 
expensive EZs were captured by property owners rather than local areas. 
Robson (1998: 113) supports this point, for instance in the case of the 
Trafford/Salford EZ, it is estimated that 60% of the financial benefit of 
designation has gone to major private property owners and land developers. 
As a result, Sissons and Brown suggest that employment and skills support to 
increase productivity are a key component of successful EZs, which contrasts 
with the 1980s emphasis on capital spending and property development.  
 
Reflecting on transferable lessons of previous experience, such as the US 
Federal Empowerment Zone and Enterprise Communities Program, Bondonio 
and Greenbaum (2006) recommend that within zone areas, greater attention 
should be paid to existing businesses, and find that two policy features have 
greater positive impacts on existing businesses: the requirement that 
incentives be tied to job creation and the requirement of a strategic local 
development plan. Erickson and Friedman (1990) also argue that if a city or 
state wishes to pursue EZ policies it should: focus on a small number of 
zones where it is likely that the intervention will have the most effect; explore 
the possibilities of more direct targeting of existing local development activities 
into the zones; and seek strong local participation. Wilder and Ruben (1996) 
also argue that better value for money could be achieved for an EZ by tying 
incentives to targeted training and hiring of zone residents or to continued 
investment by zone businesses. In relation to the role of EZ policy in the 
growth of export industries, Peterson (2009) also makes the case that EZ 
success  can be aided by: flexibility and autonomy; a single-counter service 
(e.g. business permit approvals within 24 hours); aggressive incentive 
measures (e.g. lower tax exemptions for foreign investment compared to 
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
 
18
domestic); an efficient infrastructure system (roads, ICT, water, energy, 
sewerage); and location (strategically developed near transports hubs to 
capture investments from neighbours).  According to Eingereicht von Claus 
Knoth (2000) however, EZ policy by itself should not be relied upon as an 
instrument to solve the most pressing development problems, and that given 
high setup cost and sometimes limited direct economic benefit the greatest 
value of the EZ is acting as transient experimental areas to test ideas. 
 
 
4.2 The current wave of English EZs 
 
As a recent phenomenon there are few empirical studies of the impact of 
cleaner production EZs (Shah and Rivera, 2007; Tian et al, 2014). With a 
lifespan of 25 years, it is still early days for the current batch of 24 EZs, listed 
in Table 1 (above). The English Government (HM Government, 2015) argues 
that the EZs have already provided a major boost to the national economy, 
creating more than 15,500 jobs, attracting over 480 companies and drawing 
down £2 billion in private investment. This is in return for offering tax 
incentives, simplified planning and superfast broadband to companies.  
 
Despite this, think-tanks and labour organisations such as the Centre for 
Cities and TUC (2011) also argue the ‘jury is still out’ on these EZs given 
concerns over the net economic benefit in terms of how long it takes to get 
these sites ready and how many of these jobs are displaced from elsewhere. 
For instance, the government has provided approximately £160m in 
infrastructure and capital grants to make the zones ‘shovel ready’ and is 
expected to forgo £95m in taxes until 2017 from incentives, yielding a total 
cost to the public purse of £255m. Yet the government also originally 
promised to create 54,000 jobs but reduced this pledge to 18,000 due to the 
slow uptake of businesses attracted into the zones (Rigby and Bounds, 2014).  
 
This watering down of targets for jobs created in exchange for deregulatory 
incentives is significant in terms of value for money for the public purse. Whilst 
these EZs are not only about job creation, if cost-effectiveness is measured 
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purely on this basis, the authors estimate that at the current rate the cost per 
job created is high, at £14,167 per job for 18,000 jobs created relative to 
£4,722 per job for 54,000 jobs created. This compares unfavourably with 
other recent policy interventions (see for example TUC, 2011) such as the 
Future Jobs Fund at £6,500 per job created and the New Deal for Young 
People at £3,500 per job. 
 
Perhaps there are more fundamental problems to be addressed. It has been 
suggested that there may be inherent contradictions for a cleaner production 
EZ or similar cluster between unabated growth and abated emissions 
(Monaghan, 2013; Davies, 2013). For example in the case of Baoding the 
economic boom from its solar panel industry means its carbon intensity – the 
amount of emissions per unit of GDP – appears to be higher than peer city 
equivalents (Wang et al, 2010; Su et al, 2012). That is, Baoding may actually 
be a high carbon EZ as opposed to a low carbon one on the basis that whilst 
it is manufacturing low carbon products it could be doing so in a carbon-
intensive way. Baoding may not be alone in this regard, for instance, 
Sunderland’s ultra-low carbon vehicle corridor may only result in a carbon 
positive outcome if it is part of a wider cleaner production transport strategy 
which decarbonises the national grid, discourages private car use and 
promotes public transport, reduces traffic congestion, and divests from supply 
chains reliant on Rare Earth materials (e.g. Terbium required for magnets in 
the motors of electric vehicles). Partly in recognition of this dilemma, a 
number of governments and international professional bodies are trying to re-
calibrate their approach to a green economy by piloting and establishing low 
carbon development standards which directly or indirectly impact on the 
design and operation of cleaner production EZs. Table 2 below highlights a 
number of these initiatives in England and worldwide. These standards may 
take the form of voluntary or mandated codes and guidelines which are 
specifically aimed at the governance of the EZ itself (e.g. Green SEZ Rating 
System in India) or which target a particular type of development/enterprise 
which may be located within an EZ (e.g. BREEAM in England). 
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Table 2 Rise of standards for cleaner production EZs 
Standard/code/guideline Demonstrable features relevant to zones 
Implementing GHG 
Management Systems for 
EZs in China 
Produced by IISD (2015), the report presents a conceptual framework for the 
development and implementation of a greenhouse gases (GHG) inventory system for 
EZs. For instance, alignment to China’s carbon trading pilot program and 
development of monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) systems including 
Greenhouse Gas Accounting and Reporting Guidelines for 10 Industries.  
Green building certifications 
e.g. BREEAM (England); 
Environmental management 
systems for sites/ firms, e.g. 
ISO14001 (global); pollution 
charges, e.g. EU ETS 
In England the Bristol Temple Quarter Enterprise Zone has set a number of 
sustainability design controls through BREEAM ‘excellent’ ratings for its buildings 
(Faye, 2012). Launched in 1990 by BRE, the Build Research Establishment 
Environmental Assessment Methodology (BREEAM) uses measures of performance 
related to energy and water use, the internal environment (health and well-being), 
pollution, transport, materials, waste, ecology and management processes.  
IGBC Green SEZ Rating 
System (India) 
The 2010 pilot version is an extension of the Green Special Enterprise Zone (SEZ) 
guidelines. The Indian Green Building Council and Ministry of Commerce & Industry 
prepared the Green SEZ guidelines in 2009 as a voluntary programme to facilitate 
the creation of energy efficient, water efficient, healthy, comfortable and 
environmentally friendly SEZs (IGBC, 2015). The rating programme uses well 
accepted national standards or appropriate international benchmarks, e.g. LEED. 
Low Carbon Zones: A 
Practitioner’s Handbook 
(World Bank Group) 
Produced in 2014, the handbook is designed to aid practitioners in understanding 
Low Carbon Zones (LCZs) and the systematic process required to eventually 
develop and operate such zones. The primary focus is GHG emissions accounting 
rather than cleaner production per se. Developed by the World Bank Group (2014), it 
draws upon insights primarily from pilot work on low carbon Export Processing Zones 
in Bangladesh e.g. Chittagong. 
Sustainable or smart city 
indicators e.g. ISO 37120 
(global); BSI PAS 181 
Smart City Framework 
(England) 
ISO 37120 Sustainable Development of Communities: Indicators for City Services 
and Quality of Life is an ISO standard on city metrics. It is based on a set of 100 
indicators across 17 themes which measure economic, social and environmental 
performance. It was developed and extensively tested by the Global City Indicators 
Facility, with verified cities including those which have a cleaner production EZ e.g. 
London’s Royal Docks. 
Source: Author’s tabulation based on desktop search and literature review, 03 
January 2015 
 
At the same time, even when low emission controls are imposed, it may not 
always be conducive to furthering environment justice, for example, the health 
benefit to different socio-economic groups from traffic-related air pollution 
reduction (Cesaroni et al., 2012).  
 
It has also been suggested there may be limitations to what a city can do by 
itself when it comes to promoting low carbon development, with for instance 
UN-Habitat (2012) concluding that in the absence of a national strategy for 
cleaner production EZs, they may be inappropriately selected, non-
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complimentary, fail to build trust and create unnecessary competition. For 
example as Table 1 shows, in England, more than four fifths of its current 24 
EZs have an explicit focus on exploiting some form of cleaner production, 
ranging from electric vehicles to marine energy; and in 2015 the Communities 
Secretary proposed plans for a further wave of EZs, with new ones being 
proposed and some existing ones being expanded (HM Government, 2015). 
But without clarity on an English vision for national green growth which 
dovetails with local development plans for sector specialisation it is unclear 
whether this is gold dust or fool’s gold. 
 
 
4.3 The role of policy transfer and learning 
 
Given the apparent gap between the rhetoric and conclusive evidence of EZ 
programme success, it is helpful to understand theories of how public policy is 
produced more widely, is transferred and mutated, and then to cross-tabulate 
this understanding with the knowledge of how EZ policy has been produced.  
 
In an examination of the origins of policy Page (2005: 205) argues that ideas 
are:  
 
“shaped by a vast array of different environmental circumstances, 
ranging from an immediate specific cue or impetus to a more general 
spirit of the time or even a belief in a self-evident universal truth.” 
 
McCann and Ward (2013) also argue that policy transfer needs to be 
understood in terms of policy assemblages, mobilities and mutations. The 
authors make the case that there are a number of actors involved in 
circulating or marketing potential policy products globally: law-makers 
themselves, but also political parties, think-tanks, consultants, industry trade 
associations and NGOs. A competition for influence, investment and 
resources compels these actors to shape new innovative policy solutions 
quickly and cheaply, motivating them to adopt and change models from 
elsewhere.  
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In the context of the production and transfer of EZ policy, Page cites 
Mossberger’s (2000) study of the adoption of English-style policy in the USA 
as an example of cross-national policy borrowing to emphasise the 
importance of the role of principles or broad ‘labels’ in the spread of a policy 
idea, as opposed to detailed measures to be implemented.  As suggested in 
section 3.1 above, this resulted in ‘enterprise’ and ‘empowerment’ being 
spraycan words used interchangeably with little regard to content.  
Mossberger argues that England’s idea for EZs was to remove regulatory and 
tax burdens to encourage firms to locate or invest in a particular area, which 
was in turn inspired by the idea of Hong Kong and Singapore’s freeports. As 
noted in section 3.2 earlier, what actually emerged in England according to 
Mossberger was limited liberalisation, due to business concerns about the 
need to engage communities and for public infrastructure investment. 
 
The critiques by Page and Mossberger and others of how ideas spread or are 
undermined sit well with examinations of other economic development 
policies. For instance, Mukhtarov (2014) and Thorpe (1973) in relation to the 
water and cotton mills industries respectively. 
 
Greenbaum and Landers’ (2009) analysis examines two explanations for why 
state policy makers are still proponents of EZs despite their mixed track 
record. One explanation is that academic research has not been made 
accessible enough to policy makers. A second explanation is that political 
decision-making that shapes EZ programmes is influenced by many actors 
and sources of information. Greenbaum and Landers conclude that the 
establishment or expansion of EZs may be strongly influenced by lobbying 
from businesses and landlords engaging in rent seeking behaviour (i.e. 
reducing the tax component of their operating costs, increasing land value 
capture, etc.) to take advantage of local political pressure to create jobs in 
unemployed areas. Greennbaum and Landers’ argue that policy makers may 
not engage with academic literature that they do not think is relevant. To 
make the research more relevant requires ensuring it is more timely, 
compares and contrasts the varied research to distil findings, and makes 
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recommendations for policy changes based on impact estimates in relation to 
designation criteria, targeting, marketing, management or incentive policies. 
 
 
5. Developing the concept of an Ecological Empowerment and 
Enterprise Zone 
 
5.1 Typology of cleaner production EZs 
 
Given the gap identified between rhetoric and reality it is necessary to develop 
the concept of the Ecological Enterprise Zone referred to by Dennis (1999) 
and Cato (2013).  This can best be done by devising a typology to compare 
and contrast the sustainability characteristics displayed by different cleaner 
production EZs, pulling out their best attributes, and losing those which 
evaluation suggests are less effective. This is also helpful as different EZs or 
city descriptors can use an ‘eco’ type prefix, which may be commonly used in 
different ways (see for example Joss et al, 2011; Glavic and Lukman, 2007). 
As illustrated in Table 3, the authors develop a triple typology of cleaner 
production EZ, using England as an example. The first type is one which 
focuses on advanced standards for control of material throughputs at the 
planning or operational stage (eg Bristol’s Temple Quarter application of 
BREEAM for its mixed retail development). The goal of the second type of EZ 
is the manufacture and export of technologies to trade in the global market for 
low carbon goods and services (eg Sunderland’s low-carbon car 
manufacturing plant). The third type of EZ is one which is based on a need to 
trade in a manner which restores depleted assets through ecological 
regeneration and community capacity building (eg Somerset’s eco-tourist 
site). 
 
  
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
 
24
Table 3 Cleaner production EZs in England displaying different sustainability 
characteristics 
Type of cleaner 
production 
Example of city or regional EZ 
i) Advanced standards 
for emissions or 
resource control (e.g. 
energy, water, land, 
biodiversity, 
atmosphere, minerals) 
Bristol’s Temple Quarter Enterprise Zone is a 70 ha mixed retail development containing 
new or refurbished space, featuring offices, research and development space, homes 
and retail units, an arena and a redeveloped railway station (Bristol Temple Quarter 
Enterprise Zone, 2015). Over 350 firms such as IBM and HSBC are already in the zone 
and the target is to create 4,500 jobs. Through arrangements agreed in its City Deal, 
Bristol’s vision includes delivering this as a ‘carbon neutral or carbon positive’ 
development through sustainability design controls such as BREEAM (Faye, 2012). 
ii) Trade in green 
technology or services 
(e.g. electric vehicles, 
water stress, 
sustainable food, 
renewable energy, 
waste reduction) 
The North East Enterprise Zone covers 115 ha of land bringing together clusters of 
businesses within the automotive, offshore, and renewables sectors, which together 
employ over 1,200 people (North East Enterprise Zone, 2015). It includes the city of 
Sunderland’s designation as an Ultra Low Carbon Vehicle Corridor, the supply chain for 
which is forecast to be worth up to £1 billion in the region, and already 430 companies 
focus on alternatively-fuelled vehicles such as production of the flagship Nissan Leaf car 
(The Environmentalist, 2012). 
iii) Steady state 
transition (e.g. 
ecological restoration, 
industrial symbiosis, 
community resilience) 
Somerset’s Perfect Brue is a proposed Ecological Enterprise Zone to be located in Brue 
Valley, a rich, yet sensitive, wildlife area (Somerset Local Nature Partnership, 2014). The 
plan is to harness this special environment to create green jobs by generating biomass 
for energy, promoting eco-tourism, and managing blue infrastructure to reduce flood 
risks. A key goal is to double the area managed as nature-rich wetland. 
Source: Author’s tabulation based on desktop search and literature review, 03 
January 2015 
 
The dominance of the entrepreneurial thesis suggests that the only form of EZ 
is the deregulatory version, but this survey shows that there are others. 
 
This categorisation does not mean one EZ is independent of or always 
superior to another. The same EZ may display one or more features. It may 
also be necessary for there to be a short-term increase in emissions or 
material throughput within an EZ to achieve a long-term decrease for the city 
or nation: for instance, fossil-fuelled factories which manufacture the 
equipment required to install a decarbonised grid, and then are subsequently 
decommissioned. This is akin to what Perrels (2007) argues is the search for 
the best feasible trajectory for sustainable consumption and production, which 
may ‘waver’ between the radical and the realistic. 
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5.2 Towards an activist state-led transition to an inclusive and cleaner 
economy 
 
To be an Ecological Empowerment and Enterprise Zone (EEEZ), it is argued 
here that the zone must display the sustainability characteristics of the third 
type. The EEEZ concept combines and builds on policy features of the US 
Federal Empowerment Zone and Enterprise Communities Program and the 
idea of an Ecological Enterprise Zone advocated by Dennis and Cato by 
ensuring that EEEZs aid the transition to a SSE in a manner that will empower 
communities. This is an important point as Bost (2011: 9) argues that “social 
issues remain the Achilles’ heel for many firms” operating in zones. For 
instance according to Bost, attacks on workers’ rights can be routine; a 
problem reflected in the fact that the turnover rate among workers in the firms 
concerned is high despite their being paid comparatively more than their 
counterparts. Yet, it is also argued that EZs can result in social mobility for 
women, reducing poverty and boosting equality (Bhagwati, 2007) In part in 
recognition of this dilemma, rather than focusing solely on deregulation, like in 
England, the US government EZ regime which was passed as legislation in 
1993 is focused on giving local residents more control over community 
development in zones through the Federal Empowerment Zone and 
Enterprise Community Program (Wilder and Ruben, 2007). Design of the 
Empowerment Zones policy was informed by the adverse experiences of the 
1960s Federal Model Cities program, which, like the UDCs in England, was 
“criticised for its top down approach to community participation” (Squires and 
Hall, 2013: 82). 
 
The authors argue that ‘freeing business to innovate’ can be through the 
removal of unhelpful forms of regulation (for example, eradicating the need for 
licenses and permits that are obviously tools for rent seeking, as opposed to 
maintaining high standards of innovation), not at the cost of labour or 
environmental standards. In return for these deregulatory incentives, 
businesses located within the EEEZ would be required to focus on what a 
bounded economy needs to deliver (Jackson, 2009).   
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Thus the EEEZ is intended to be different from other cleaner production EZs 
and wider forms of ABIs, in particular because it is not necessarily 
deregulatory in terms of arguing that progress is made when the state gets off 
the back of entrepreneurs. By doing so it grounds the concept in the broader 
‘state-business-society’ discussion relating to cities as agents in global climate 
change and eco-modernisation more generally. Here, alongside focused 
support for low carbon businesses, niche innovation by communities such as 
Transition Towns of the kind described by Seyfang and Smith (2007) also 
plays a pivotal role, catalysing community engagement with sustainability 
action. The transition to a sustainable economy is not just through 
experimentation by ‘heroic’ industrialists: communities also innovate, and this 
can also be catalysed through ABIs to support nodes where such community-
based ‘ecopreneurs’ congregate (North and Longhurst 2013; Gibbs and 
O’Neil, forthcoming).  
 
The approach to developing a socially equitable, state led transition to a low 
carbon economy is perhaps best aligned to a political economy concept which 
values the contribution of the private market to industrial development but also 
recognises the role of the state to act as a manager or facilitator rather than a 
controller of an economy (Lall, 1992 and 2003; Gereffit et al, 2001; Westphal, 
2002; Wood, 2003).  
 
Applying this approach to the EEEZ concept involves selective interventions 
in overcoming the market and institutional failures necessary to build the 
capabilities required to facilitate the transition to an inclusive and low carbon 
economy.  In doing so, however, an important consideration is not just the 
mode in which the state, business or society intervene, but also at what stage. 
There is transferable lessons learned from EIPs here. For instance, citing 
case studies from Chinese EIPs in Suzhou and Tianjin, Yu et al (2013, 2015) 
identify at what stage strong steering or a more facilitative role by the state 
were conducive to economic and ecological success, and under what 
conditions no, relative or even absolute decoupling of economic growth from 
the use of natural resources took place. Given this, what are the key stages in 
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the innovation or investment cycle where the state can intervene to promote 
the EEEZ concept?  
 
Innovations such as breakthrough technology is considered a key contributor 
to stronger GDP as it can provide a comparative advantage in high-tech 
sectors by allowing capital and labour to be used more productively over time, 
which can attract more investment and potentially boost. It is also argued 
however that whilst R&D spending and trade is necessary for sustained 
industrial development, it may be unproductive or not sufficient. Only the 
fastest growing firms in a period of the life-cycle when competition is most 
fierce tend to reap the rewards from R&D, and an absence of complimentary 
assets at the firm level such as infrastructure or marketing capabilities can 
mean R&D becomes redundant (Mazzucato, 2013; Lall, 203). An absence of 
trade restrictions and taxes can also render infant industries uncompetitive 
against more established rivals, or result in wealth reduction for the most 
disadvantaged in society if the developing country does not have welfare or 
educational infrastructure to cope (Stiglitz and Charlton, 2005; Kozul-Wright 
and Rayment, 2007). 
 
To better capture the benefits of international trade and ensure imperfect 
markets are not welfare-reducing, Chang (2002, 2008) and Stiglitz and 
Charlton (2005) argue that awareness of and assistance with the costs of 
adjustment is required, ranging from easing supply constraints (finance, 
technical assistance) to developing consensus on product standards. 
 
Mazzucato (2013) also argues however that a failing of political economists 
such as Chang (2008) is that they perceive the role of the state in promoting 
development as assistance to a catching up process, which wrongly views the 
state as a ‘passive entrepreneur of last resort’. As part of debunking public 
sector versus private sector myths, instead the author makes the case that 
“the state does not ‘de-risk’… it takes on risks, shaping and creating new 
markets” (2013: 9). In such an instance, the state is an entrepreneur of ‘first 
resort’. To support this point, examples are cited from the US pharmaceuticals 
and ICT sectors, where most revolutionary new drugs or the iPhone are 
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developed mostly with public funds. More than this, says Mazzucato, private 
sector funds then ‘surf the wave’ created by the public sector. Mazzucato 
(2013) makes the point however that there is a big difference between the 
state taking a back seat and simply subsidising or incentivising investments. 
Compared to, for instance, the role of state development banks in providing a 
form of ‘patient finance’ (2013: 157) and high risk funding to give an initial 
push to winning industries, such as trade nurtured in wind turbines and solar 
power in China (e.g. SunTech Power), Denmark (e.g. Vesta), Germany and 
the USA (e.g. Kenetech). This is as part of a wider enabling public policy 
environment to help infant industries to flourish, which includes instruments 
such as feed in tariffs, greenhouse reduction targets, and carbon taxes. 
According to Mazzucato, what separates China from the rest is its much 
longer-term commitment, noting the US’s withdrawal of support for renewable 
energy in the 1980s. China’s ongoing support for firms has led to the 
downside risk of ‘trade wars’ (2013: 149), for instance, ‘local content rules’ for 
the supply chain of Foreign Director Investors such as Goldwind (70% local 
content in all turbines). Another upside however, in addition to a jobs push, 
has been the systemic ‘green benefits to this intervention’, for example, the C-
Sti technology is a move away from China/sector reliance on Rare Earths in 
the supply chain (2013: 157). 
 
 
5.3 Capturing shared value from the state as a risk taker 
 
The risk-reward relationship is key to realising the direct/indirect return to the 
economy and state from public support (Mazzucato, 2013). Innovation tends 
to reduce inequality when the distribution of financial rewards for the 
innovation process reflects the distribution of contributions to the innovation 
process. Yet the state does not earn a return for its investments indirectly via 
taxation as the system was not conceived to support innovation and because 
tax evasion is a concern. An example of the state getting this risk-reward 
nexus wrong is Apple, says Mazzucato. It is argued that Apple is often 
wrongly used to laud the power of the market and Schumpeterian creative 
destruction. That is, the process by which innovation changes the status quo 
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to allow the market shares of firms that introduce new goods to grow, at the 
expense of failing firms who resist this change. 
 
According to Mazzucato, prior to Apple’s IPO in 1980 it received $0.5 million 
early stage equity investment by the Illinois small business investment 
company. When formed to sell its personal computer (PC), the technology 
was based on breakthroughs achieved through public-private partnerships 
established by government and the military during between 1960 and 1970s 
for silicon in semiconductors which meant PCs could be affordable for mass 
consumer market. Mazzucato concludes that the solution is a ‘golden share of 
IPR’ for the state investor, with royalties going to a national innovation fund 
and development banks. Successful examples cited include the China CDB 
£3 billion investment in Argentine wind which includes the involvement of 
Chinese companies in the supply chain; Brazil BNDES’ 21% Return on Equity 
investment in clean and biotechnology; and Finland’s SITRA support for Nokia 
(Mazzucato, 2013). By comparison, says Mazzucato, the US and England do 
not do this “for ‘fear’… the next step is communism” (2013: 190). 
 
Based on these transferable insights, the EEEZ concept also proposes in 
return from deregulatory incentives that businesses located in the zone are 
required to negotiate shared value capture deals in return for infant industry 
support. These deals go beyond local content requirements, to include fair 
corporate tax payment, and golden shares of IPR which is recycled locally on 
patient finance via regional development banks or supports adjustment costs. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
To inform the contribution of low carbon spatial strategy to the sustainable 
cities agenda, this paper has set out to test the hypothesis that EZ policy can 
aid the transition to local sustainable development. Taking England as one 
example, there appears to be limited evidence to support the case for the 
blanket application of EZs in their laissez-faire, deregulated form. Whilst there 
is empirical evidence to suggest that different versions of EZs and other ABIs 
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do contribute to growth or regeneration, for example in the Isle of Dogs/ 
Canary Wharf (London), a distillation of various studies finds the rationale for 
EZ policy over other types of economic instrument to be inconclusive given 
that there are examples of failure too. On this basis, the hypothesis is 
rejected. 
 
Despite the inconsistent record of previous EZ regimes, a survey of English 
EZs by the authors suggests that a new and cleaner production form of EZs 
have emerged to support the transition to sustainable cities and are on the 
rise: in England over four fifths of the 24 EZs in operation have an explicit 
interest in exploiting some type of cleaner production. A business case cited 
for these cleaner production EZs is that the proximity of firms inside the zone 
can facilitate the application of principles of eco-efficiency and industrial 
ecology through information sharing and provision of centralised pollution 
prevention expertise. 
 
Heeding the lessons from the past and developing ideas going forward, it is 
argued here that for the hypothesis to possibly be sustained in the future and 
represent good value for money for the public purse, policymakers need to 
better understand the intersection and application of state and market-
mechanisms, niche innovation, economic geography, and ecology. This 
means paying more attention to developing the concept of an EEEZ which 
combines and builds on policy features of the US Federal Empowerment 
Zone and Enterprise Communities Program and the idea of an ecological EZ 
advocated by Dennis and Cato, and develops the notion of the activist state 
by Mazzucato which recognises the valuable role of the public sector as an 
entrepreneur of first resort and a provider of patient finance.  
 
The EEEZ will more likely flourish with three enabling factors. First, bringing 
the state back in through the establishment of a national industrial strategy 
which ensures city competitiveness plans in relation to low carbon goods and 
services are specialised and complimentary, thus avoiding market confusion 
and duplication. Second, bringing cleaner production back in through the 
adoption of a holistic approach to urban planning which is ecologically 
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regenerative as well as well circular, so that economic activity in cities both 
restores natural assets and lowers material intensity. Third, bringing social 
inclusion back in through the placement of requirements on businesses 
located within the zones to recruit and develop the local workforce, support 
community development and safeguard the local environment in return for 
deregulatory incentives so that the benefits of social mobility are for the long-
term and dovetail with wider city regeneration strategy. 
 
 
 
  
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
 
32
References 
 
Alcott, B., 2008. The sufficiency strategy: would rich-world frugality lower 
environmental impact. Ecological Economics, 64: 770-786. 
Bailey, N. Barker, A. and MacDonald, K., 1995. Partnership Agencies in 
British Urban Policy. UCL Press: London. 
Bhagwati, J., 2004. In Defence of Globalisation. Oxford University Press, 
Oxford. 
Bilings, S., 2009. Do Enterprise Zones work? An analysis at the borders. 
Public Finance Review, 37: 68-93. 
Bondonio, D. and Engberg. J., 2000. Enterprise zones and local employment: 
evidence from the States’ programs. Regional Science and Urban 
Economics, 30: 519-549. 
Bondonio, D. and R.T. Greenbaum, 2007. Do Tax Incentives Affect Local 
Economic Growth? What Mean Impacts Miss in the Analysis of 
Enterprise Zone Policies. Regional Science and Urban Economics, 
37(1): 121-136. 
Bondonio, D. and R.T. Greenbaum, 2014. Revitalizing Regional Economies 
through Enterprise Support Policies: An Impact Evaluation of Multiple 
Instruments. European Urban and Regional Studies, 21(1): 79-103. 
Bost, F., 2011. West African Challenges: Are Economic Free Zones Good for 
Development? OECD, Paris. 
Bowen, A. and Frankhauser, A. 2011. The green growth narrative. Global 
Environmental Change, 21: 1157-1159. 
Boyenge, J., S., 2007. ILO database on export processing zones. ILO, 
Geneva. 
Bristol Temple Quarter Enterprise Zone, 2015. Available from 
http://www.bristoltemplequarter.com/about-the-zone (accessed 03 
January 2015) 
Bulkeley, H.A., Castan Broto, V., Hodson, M. & Marvin, S., 2010. Cities and 
Low Carbon Transitions. Routledge, London. 
Butler, S.M., 1981. Enterprise Zones: Greenlining the Inner Cities. 
Heinemenn, London. 
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
 
33
Catalano, A., 1983. A Review of UK Enterprise Zones, CES Paper 17. CES, 
London. 
Cesaroni, G., Boogaard, H., Jonkers, S., Porta, D., Badaloni, C., Cattani, G., 
Forastiere, F. and Hoek, G., 2012. Health Benefit of Traffic-Related Air 
Pollution Reduction in Different Socio-Economic Groups: the effect of 
Low Emission Zoning in Rome. Occupational and Environmental 
Medicine, 69: 133-139. 
Cato, M.S., 2013. The Paradox of Green Keynesianism. Green House, 
London. 
Chang, H., 2002. Kicking Away the Development Ladder. Anthem Press, 
London. 
Chang, H., 2008. Bad Samaritans. Random House, London. 
Chatham House, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Energy Research Institute, 
Jilin University and 3G, 2010. Low Carbon Development Road Map for 
Jilin City. Chatham House, London. 
Cole, H.S.D., 1973. The structure of the world models. Futures, February: 14-
32. 
Creswell, J., 2009. Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed 
Methods Approaches. Sage, Thousand Oaks. 
Daly, H.E., 1996. Beyond Growth. Beacon Press, Boston. 
Daly, H.E., 1978. Steady State Economics: Biophysical Equilibrium and Moral 
Growth. W.H.Freeman & Co Ltd, Boston. 
Davies, A.R., 2013. Cleantech clusters: Transformational assemblages for a 
just, green economy or just business as usual? Global Environmental 
Change, 23: 1285–1295. 
Dennis, M., 1999. Statement of Vice President and General Counsel, The 
Nature onservancy Testimony before the US Subcommittee on 
Oversight of the House Committee on Ways and Means. Hearing on the 
Impact of Tax Law on Land Use, Conservation, and Preservation. 
September 30, 1999. 
Department of Environment, 1995. Final Evaluation of Enterprise Zones. 
London, DoE. 
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
 
34
Erickson, R.A. and Friedman, S.W., 1990. Enterprise zones: 2. A comparative 
analysis of zone performance and state government policies. 
Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 8: 363-378. 
Farole, T. and Akinci, G., 2011. Special Enterprise Zones: Progress, 
Emerging Challenges and Future Directions. World Bank Group, 
Washington DC. 
Fordham, G., Hutchinson, J. and Foley, P., 1999. Strategic Approaches to 
Local Regeneration: The Single Regeneration Budget Fund. Regional 
Studies, 33(2): 131-141. 
Gereffi, G., Humphrey, J., Kaplinsky, R. and Sturgeon, T. J., 2001. 
Introduction: Globalisation, value chains and development. IDS Bulletin, 
Institute of Development Studies, Sussex, 32(2): 1-8. 
Gibbs, D and O’Neill, K, forthcoming. Rethinking socio-technical transitions 
and green entrepreneurship: the potential for transformative change in 
the green building sector. Environment and Planning A. 
Glavic, P. and Lukman, R., 2007. Review of sustainability terms and their 
definitions. Journal of Cleaner Production, 15: 1875-1885. 
Greenbaum, R.T., 1998. An Evaluation of State Enterprise Zone Policies: 
Measuring the Impact on Business Decisions and Housing Market 
Outcomes. PhD thesis. Carnegie Mellon University. 
Greenbaum, R.T. and Engberg, J.B., 2004. The Impact of State Enterprise 
Zones on Urban Manufacturing Establishments. Journal of Policy 
Analysis and Management, 23(2): 315-39.   
Greenbaum, R.T. and Landers, J. 2009. Why are State Policy Makers Still 
Proponents of Enterprise Zones? What Explains Their Action in the Face 
of a Preponderance of the Research? International Regional Science 
Review, 32(4): 466-479. 
Harvey, D., 1989. From Managerialism to Entrepreneurialism: The 
Transformation in Urban Governance in Late Capitalism. Human 
Geography, 71(1): 3-17. 
Heinberg, R., 2011. The End of Growth: Adapting to Our New Economic 
Reality. Clairview, Forest Row. 
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
 
35
Hirasuna, D. and Michael, J., 2005. Enterprise Zones: A review of the 
economic theory and empirical evidence. A policy brief by the research 
department of the Minnesota House of Representatives. 
HM Government, 2014. Enterprise zones: looking for a place to grow your 
business. Available from 
http://enterprisezones.communities.gov.uk/about-enterprise-zones/ 
(accessed 01 December 2014). 
HM Government, 2015. Boost for business as Government backs new 
Enterprise `[ Zones. Available from 
http://enterprisezones.communities.gov.uk/boost-business-government-
backs-enterprise-zones/ (accessed 03 January 2015). 
Hodson, M. & Marvin, S., 2012. Mediating Low-Carbon Urban Transitions? 
Forms of Organization, Knowledge and Action. European Planning 
Studies 20(3): 421-439. 
House of Commons Library, 2014. Enterprise Zones. House of Commons 
Library, London. 
IFC, 2014. Low Carbon Zones: A Practitioner’s Handbook. World Bank Group: 
Washington DC. 
IGBC, 2015. Green SEZ Rating System (Pilot Version). Available from 
https://igbc.in/igbc/redirectHtml.htm?redVal=showGreenSEZnosign 
(accessed 03 January 2015). 
Jackson, T., 2009. Prosperity without Growth: Economics for a Finite Planet. 
Earthscan, London. 
Joss, S., Tomozeiu, D., Cowley, R., 2011. Eco-Cities – A Global Survey 2011, 
International Eco-Cities Initiative. University of Westminster, London. 
Keller, E., A., Day Jr., J.W., 2007. Untrammeled growth as an environmental 
“March of Folly”. Ecological Engineering, 30: 206-214. 
Kozul-Wright, R., and Rayment, P., 2007. The Resistible Rise of Market 
Fundamentalism. Zed Books, London. 
Lall, S., 1992. Technological capabilities and industrialization. World 
Development, 20(2): 165-86. 
Lall, S., 2003. Reinvesting industrial strategy: the role of government policy in 
building industrial competitiveness. ODID Working Paper Series, 111: 1-
35. 
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
 
36
Larkin, K. and Wilcox, Z., 2011. What would Maggie do? Why the 
Government’s policy on enterprise zones needs to be radically different 
to the failed policy of the 1980s. Centre for Cities, London. 
Lawson, N. 2008. An appeal to reason: a cool look at global warming. 
Duckworth Overlook, London. 
Lomborg, B. 2001. The Sceptical Environmentalist. Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge. 
Lorek, S. and Spangenberg, J.H., 2014. Sustainable consumption within a 
sustainable economy – beyond green growth and green economies. 
Cleaner Production Journal, 63: 33–44. 
Luque-Ayala, A. & Marvin, S., 2015. Developing a Critical Understanding of 
Smart Urbanism?. Urban Studies 52(12): 2105-2116. 
Mazzucato, M, 2013. The Entrepreneurial State. Anthem Press, London. 
McCann, E. and Ward, K., 2013. A multi-disciplinary approach to policy 
transfer research: geographies, assemblages, mobilities and mutations. 
Policy Studies, 34(1): 2-18. 
Meadows, D.H., Meadows, D.L., Randers, J., Behrens III, W.W., 1972. The 
Limits to Growth. Universal Books, New York. 
Meijers, E., 2007. Synergy in Polycentric Urban Regions Complementarity, 
Organising Capacity and Critical Mass. PhD thesis. Delft University. 
Monaghan, P., 2013. Low carbon enterprise zones: towards a fossil fuel free 
economy, in The Green Economy of Cities: A World Compendium on the 
Green Urban Economy, 3(1), eds. Simpson, R., Otto-Zimmerman, K. 
Springer, Freiburg. 
Mossberger, K., 2000. The Politics of Ideas and Spread of Enterprise Zones. 
Georgetown University Press, Washington. 
Mukhtarov, F.,2014. Rethinking the travel of ideas: policy translation in the 
water sector. Policy and Politics, 42 (1): 71-88. 
North East Enterprise Zone, 2015. Available from 
http://nelep.co.uk/enterprise-zone (accessed 03 January 2015). 
North, P., 2000. Is there space for organisation from below within the UK 
Government's Action Zones?: a test of 'collaborative planning.’. Urban 
Studies, 37: 1261-1278. 
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
 
37
North, P., 2010. Eco-localisation as a progressive response to peak oil and 
climate change – a sympathetic critique. Geoforum, 3: 585-594. 
North, P, 2011. Geographies and utopias of Cameron's Big Society’. Social & 
Cultural Geography, 12: 817-827. 
North, P. and Longhurst, N., 2013. Grassroots Localisation? The Scalar 
Potential of and Limits of the ‘Transition’ Approach to Climate Change 
and Resource Constraint. Urban Studies, 50: 1423-1438. 
Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, 1995. Final Evaluation of Enterprise 
Zones. Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, London. 
Page, E.C., 2005. The Origins of Policy. The Oxford Handbook of Public 
Policy, 205-224. 
Perrels, A., 2007. Wavering between radical and realistic sustainable 
consumption policies: in search for the best feasible trajectories. Journal 
of Cleaner Production, 16: 1203-1217. 
Peterson, E., 2009. Unlocking Land Values to Finance Infrastructure. World 
Bank Group, Washington DC. 
Porter, M.E., 1990. The Competitive Advantage of Nations. MacMillan, 
London. 
Porter, M.E., 1997. New Strategies for Inner-City Economic Development. 
Economic Development Quarterly, 11: 1. 
Puppim de Oliveira, J. A., et al, 2013. Green economy and governance in 
cities: assessing good governance in key urban economic processes. 
Journal of Cleaner Production, 58: 138-152. 
Rigby, E. and Bounds, A., 2014. Second wave of UK enterprise zones 
planned. Financial Times, 11 November 2014. 
Robson, B., 1988. Those Inner Cities: Reconciling the Economic and Social 
Aims of Urban Policy. Clarendon Press, Oxford. 
Satterthwaite, D., 2009. The Implications of Population Growth and 
Urbanization for Climate Change’. Environment & Urbanization, 21 (2), 
545-567. 
Scott, F., 2012. Green Cities: Using Low Carbon Deals to Drive City Growth. 
Green Alliance, London. 
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
 
38
Seyfang, G. and Smith, A., 2007. Grassroots innovations for sustainable 
development: Towards a new research and policy agenda. 
Environmental Politics, 16(4): 584-603. 
Shah, K.U., and Rivera, J.E., 2007. Export processing zones and corporate 
environmental performance in emerging economies: The case of the oil, 
gas, and chemical sectors of Trinidad and Tobago. Policy Sciences, 40: 
265-285. 
Shaw, K. and Robinson, F., 2010. UK urban regeneration policies in the early 
21st Century: continuity or change?. Town Planning Review, 81(2): 123-
150. 
Sissons, A. and Brown, C., 2011. Do Enterprise Zones Work? The Work 
Foundation, London. 
Somerset Local Nature Partnership, 2014. Naturally Somerset. Somerset 
Local Nature Partnership, Somerset. 
Squires, G. and Hall, S., 2013. Lessons (un)learning in spatially targeted fiscal 
incentive policy: Enterprise Zones (England) and Empowerment Zones 
(United States). Land Use Policy, 33: 81-89. 
Stiglitz, J.E., and Charlton, A., 2015. Fair Trade for All. Oxford University 
Press, Oxford. 
Su, M., Liang, C., Chen, B., Chen, S., Yang, Z., 2012. Low-carbon 
development patterns: observations of Chinese cities. Energies, 5: 291-
304. 
Taylor, S., 1981. The politics of enterprise zones. Public Administration, 59: 
421-439. 
The Environmentalist, 2012. North east flies higher. The Environmentalist, 
November 2012: 14-16. 
Tian, J., Liu, W., Lai, B., Li, X., & Chen, L., 2014. Study of the performance of 
eco-industrial park development in China. Journal of Cleaner Production, 
64: 486–494. 
TUC, 2011. Are Enterprise Zones the answer? Will they create additional jobs 
at the levels desired? http://touchstoneblog.org.uk/2011/05/are-
enterprise-zones-the-answer-will-they-create-additional-jobs-at-the-
levels-desired/ (accessed 3 January 2015) 
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
 
39
UN-Habitat, 2012. Urban Patterns for an Urban Economy: Clustering for 
Competitiveness. UN-Habitat, Nairobi. 
Victor, P.A., 2008. Managing Without Growth: Slower by Design, Not Disaster. 
Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham. 
von Claus Knoth, E., 2000. Special Economic Zones and Economic 
Transformation: The Case of the People’s Republic of China. PhD 
thesis. Konstanz University. 
Wang, T., Zhang, Z., Wu, J., 2010. Towards Low Carbon Cities of China’s 
SEZs – The Case of Shenzen. Chinese Academy of Sciences, Lanzhou.  
Westphal, L., 2002. Technology strategies for economic development in a fast 
changing global economy. Economics of Innovation and New 
Technology, 11, 275-320. 
Wilder, M.G. and Rubin, B.M., 1996. Rhetoric versus reality: a review on 
studies of State Enterprise Zone programs. Journal of America Planning 
Association, 62(4): 473-491.  
Wood, A. (ed.), 2003. Symposium on infant industries. Oxford Development 
Studies, 31(1): 3-20. 
World Bank Group, 2014. Low Carbon Zones: A Practitioner’s Handbook. 
World Bank Group, Washington, DC. 
Yu, C., de Jong, M., Dijkema, G.P.J, 2013. Process analysis of eco-industrial 
park development – the case of Tianjin, China. Journal of Cleaner 
Production, 64: 464-477. 
Yu, C., Dijkema, G.P.J, de Jong, M., Shi, H., 2015. From an eco-industrial 
park towards an eco-city: a case study in Suzhou, China. Journal of 
Cleaner Production, 102: 264-274. 
 
 
